2). Allies and Proxies – the limits and hence the future thereof in Ukraine, and of Iran in the Iran/Israel/USA War, are clearly seen as not reliable nor sustainable for long. OP-Sindoor was fought almost wholly by India, even as the weapons, intelligence and radar systems supplied to Pakistan by Turkiye, China and even the USA proved woefully inadequate. The only Allies that India can perhaps depend on, are those countries that have clearly and consistently demonstrated their commitment to India over the years, which are Israel and Russia.

3). Circumstances as applicable in- Ukraine/Russia/Iran/Israel and USA, Conflict / War have already been explained above. Air superiority and control of Air-space, is clearly shown as something desirable and to be established as early in the conflict as possible.

4). Leadership / Command and Control – Centralized or Decentralized – how much and how effective? Example of Iran and how we can organize our Forces.

5). Societal unrest: Social protests and unrest in Iran against the Islamic regime. How to use it? How the IRGC is crushing such protests and why the UN is not highlighting the denial of Human Rights. How external forces / Deep State, are striving to de-stabilize India by encouraging dissent and un- rest in India and so bring about a regime change or even civil war and divisions, as they had done elsewhere in the Region, in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal.

India recognizes the need to be alert to such actions and take stringent measures. Acts such as the Uniform Civil Code (UCC), the National Registry of Citizens (NRC) and the Foreign Contribution Regulatory Act (FCRA), are essential steps that are being taken.

6). Weapons Development: Today, new weapon types, and advanced surveillance and communication technologies, allow for different strategies, amplifying cost advantages resulting in asymmetric warfare. This can be compared to Guerilla Tactics of yore.

Of course, further technological developments will keep re-adjusting asymmetric cost advantages of weapons and counter weapons. Static defensive measures, even if built deep underground, have been shown to be not as effective protection as believed, both in Iran and in Pakistan. Such measures, even if designed to adequately resist any aerial bombardment as visualised at the time of construction, will not be able to resist future advances in the strike capabilities. Future offensive capabilities of the envisaged adversaries will continue to be more advanced and hence more effective; therefore, such static defensive measures must be protected by weapons and effective counter systems that are also continually improved to effectively foil future attacks. Allowing the enemy clear Air-superiority can never be acceptable.

The use of AI in the many aspects of development of weapons and technologies and even in media to generate narratives, must be prevented from harming Humanity. (See- Appendix-3)

7). Choke Points: Choke points such as the Suez and Panama Canals, straits of Bab el- Mandeb, Hormuz, Malacca, Bosphorus and the Sunda straits and ‘High-Ground’, which could be any sort of power position, geographic or even key technology, and resources, must be within our ability to monitor and when necessary to protect our interest or even exercise control thereon and denying the same to the enemy/adversary, resorting to Cover by Fire, and the use of Mines and other obstacles and systems etc. We should expand our island bases, such as being undertaken, on the Car-Nicobar Island, and even on suitable locations on the Lakshadweep islands, to establish and strengthen our abilities for surveillance and control over the choke-points in the seas and over ‘High Ground’ elsewhere.

The advantages of the proposed Rama-Nahar canals project, a dual Panama type canal across the KRA Isthmus connecting the Andaman Sea to the South Vietnam Sea, would greatly enhance India’s maritime security and also greatly enhance international sea-trade between the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions, and even eliminate the threat of piracy that now exists when traversing the Malacca straits. This should be taken up more strongly with Thailand as being for mutual benefit, even if at as present, Thailand is being influenced to consider a land transfer/transit facility, if at all, by other affected countries.

Also, Trans-country pipelines, Railways and Highways for safer trade should also be taken up.

8). Present and Future wars: Wars today, are not just being fought by only our Military in border regions, but also all across the Country and in different ways and we need to recognize and prepare for such methods. India’s ‘No First Use’ policy for ‘Nuclear’ weapons, and our general peaceful attitude, calls for a very strong, credible and recognized ‘Second-strike’ capability across the spectrum.

A fairly de-centralized military command structure, with an Integrated Military Head Quarters and appropriate Theatre Commands. The Iran war demonstrates the advantage of such de-centralization of Command. The aim should be to have centralised strategic direction with the ability of decentralised execution of pre-approved/ considered plans when communications are disrupted.

Our Integrated Military Head Quarters must be staffed by personnel and Commanders from all the Services with common Uniforms and Badges of Rank, to instil an effective common and objective attitude, not a parochial or partisan attitude.

At above operating formation levels, it is the strategic thinking capabilities that are required from our Commanders/Generals. Their Deputies from each Service will be able to help them co-ordinate across Services, as may be necessary. Do remember that in the second World War, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the East was General Douglas McArthur and in the West was General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and they were both very effective and successful.

We should have greater confidence in our appreciation and selection processes and in our Training Establishments, starting from the National Defence Academy, through Defence Services Staff College, and other such Joint Services establishments such as the National Defence College.

Theatre Commands – India is a large Country, with great terrain and climatic variations and very different threat perception across the various regions of the Country, it hence needs region specific Integrated and multi-Services Theatre Commands each of which must have a comprehensive defensive capability and also a very effective and independent offensive strike capability, that should be organized and equipped as required. Their operational plans should be independently calibrated to meet any threat they may face and coordinated through the Integrated Head Quarters and with the other adjacent Theatre Commands. Theatre Commanders should also be able to function effectively, as per pre-determined plans, even if communications with other Commands or the Head Quarters is compromised. Continual interaction at various levels and reasonable awareness of each other’s responsibilities and plans will help. Modular, functional units should be considered, where feasible, to allow for cross support across theatres.

Each Theatre Command should also be organised with offensive and defensive troops and capabilities. This will allow for better use of troops and resources. All defensive forces need not be as fit as the offensive element, thus allowing for better use of experienced troops

Areas in which we need to expand our capabilities: All under our ‘Atmanibhar’ programme. The value and involvement of our Private Sector, even as the danger of the unbridled growth of the military industrial complex as in the USA, must be recognized and regulated against. Allowing for the User at various appropriate levels to determine the need for, and procure their requirements preferably locally, as is being done today is a good decision, avoiding bureaucratic delays and cost overruns.

We should note the example of the European countries today, who trusting USA for their Defence, cut down on Military costs and now as the UK Defence Minister quotes his General as saying they are not only not ready for war, but also, they do not have an adequate standing Military Force.

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