2). Allies and Proxies – the limits and hence the future thereof in Ukraine, and of Iran in the Iran/Israel/USA War, are clearly seen as not reliable nor sustainable for long. OP-Sindoor was fought almost wholly by India, even as the weapons, intelligence and radar systems supplied to Pakistan by Turkiye, China and even the USA proved woefully inadequate. The only Allies that India can perhaps depend on, are those countries that have clearly and consistently demonstrated their commitment to India over the years, which are Israel and Russia.

3). Circumstances as applicable in- Ukraine/Russia/Iran/Israel and USA, Conflict / War have already been explained above. Air superiority is clearly shown as something desirable and to be established as early in the conflict as possible.

4). Leadership / Command and Control – Centralized or Decentralized – how much and how effective? Example of Iran and how we can organize our Forces.

5). Societal unrest in Iran against the Islamic regime. How to use it? How the IRGC is crushing such protests and why the UN is not highlighting the denial of Human Rights. How external forces/Deep State, are striving to de-stabilize India by encouraging dissent and un-rest in India and so bring about a regime change or even civil war and divisions, as they had done elsewhere in the Region, in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal. India recognizes the need to be alert to such actions and take stringent measures. The Uniform Civil Code (UCC), National Registry of Citizen (NRC) and the Foreign Contributions Regulatory Act (FCRA) Acts are essential steps that are being taken.

6). Today, new weapon types, and advanced surveillance and communication technologies, allow for different strategies, amplifying cost advantages resulting in asymmetric warfare. This can be compared to Guerilla Tactics of yore.

Of course, further technological developments will keep re-adjusting such asymmetric cost advantages. static defensive measures, even if built deep underground, have been shown to be not as effective protection as believed, both in Iran and in Pakistan. Such measures, even if designed to adequately resist any aerial bombardment as visualised at the time of construction, will not be able to resist future advances in the strike capabilities. Future offensive capabilities of the envisaged adversaries will continue to be more advanced and hence more effective; therefore, such static defensive measures must be protected by weapons that are also continually improved to effectively foil future attacks. Allowing the enemy clear Air superiority is not an acceptable situation.

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